Hay que hacer algo asi y publicarlo.

[marrajo]

marrajo 6/10/2006 07:20
Hay que hacer algo asi y publicarlo.

Date:
Location: Depth:
No formal reports are available yet. Identity undisclosed pending notification of family. Diver apparently embolized when his dive hose was taken by manta ray.



Ryan Erter Date: August 2nd 2006
Location: VR 250 Depth:
No formal reports are available yet. Diver Erter apparently died in the deck chamber after recompression for suspected DCS following a normally executed dive to approximately 150 FSW. Erter's employer has released no information regarding the accident and the diving community awaits the reports from the Coast Guard and the MMS.



Marc Begneaux Date: July 5th 2003
Location: EW 827 Depth: 634
Coast Guard Report
On 05 July 2003, A diver was pronounced dead as a result of an explosion during welding operations of an underwater gas wellhead located at Ewing Banks (block 827) of the Gulf of Mexico, approximately 630ft below the surface.
Full USCG report 1867086 available here

MMS Report
Divers were sent down to cut windows in all the strings of casing in the stub of a temporarily abandoned well. The well was protruding vertically out of the seafloor about 15 feet. The wellhead had several layers of casing with a connector on top of the wellhead that had two four-inch holes machined into it. Bubbles were coming out of the holes. The divers jetted around the casing stub to a depth of 20 feet, leaving a 35 foot stub.

The divers and other onsite personnel did not have drawings or schematics of the actual configuration of the well, but did have a simplistic drawing of the configuration. Subsequent interviews revealed that the operator’s onsite representative and the dive personnel present were not familiar with the well head adapter.

After jetting the seafloor, the well was plum bobbed to ascertain the concrete levels. No cement was found when the plumb bob was lowered into the well. Vent holes were drilled very near the top of the outer casing to allow any trapped gas to escape. The crew assumed that the distance between the cutting area and any possible attic area was sufficient to prevent any cinders from the cutting area to reach any attic area. A large window was cut into the outer casing at the -20 foot level to allow access to the next inner casing. They attempted to drill another vent hole through the inner casing. The diver tried to drill the hole, but had trouble getting the drill bit through the hole in the outer casing. He decided to make the hole larger with his cutting torch. Soon after he started cutting with his torch an explosion occurred, resulting in his death.

During a recent well plugging and abandonment operation, a diver was fatally injured when an explosion occurred during the cutting of a section of casing with a torch. The MMS investigation of the accident, conducted in conjunction with the U. S. Coast Guard, revealed, in part, the following:

The operator of the lease gave the diving contractor, who was responsible for the well stub removal, a pre-job schematic of the well stub configuration that differed from the actual configuration. The well casings were fitted with a wellhead adaptor which, although it contained two vent holes, allowed gases produced during burning operations to accumulate in a space above the holes. Further, gas was noted to be coming from the vent holes immediately prior to and during the removal operation. Although the configuration discrepancy and gas venting were observed and raised initial concerns on the part of the contractor prior to the removal operation, subsequent discussion between the operator’s onsite representative and the contractor’s onsite supervisors resulted in no prescribed procedure to determine if gas could accumulate above the vent holes. It was also revealed that at least one diving crew employee, while recognizing the possibility, not probability, of gas accumulation, believed the torch to be distant enough from any gas accumulation to be a potential ignition source. No Job Safety Analysis (JSA) was conducted for the immediate mechanical aspects of the well removal with respect to cutting and burning.

MMS concluded that hydrogen gas from the burning operation accumulated above the referenced vent holes and was ignited during burning operation by a cinder that floated to the gas in an air bubble. MMS further concluded that multiple causes of the accident ranged from having no JSA for the immediate task of well stub removal to a failure on the part of operator and contract onsite personnel to react appropriately to onsite conditions other than those expected.

Therefore, on the basis of its investigative conclusions, MMS recommends that in the matter of diving operations, especially those involving well head removals, lessees and operators review their policies and procedures regarding

The transfer to contractors of technical information pertinent to the contracted tasks (information transfer).

The onsite responsibilities of lessee and operator representatives with respect to unexpected conditions and resultant enforced termination or modification of contractor operations (management of change).

The required use by contractors of JSA’s for any contracted task involving hazards (job planning and hazard avoidance).




Chris Mouritsen Date: July 6th 2002
Location: EI 273 Depth: 103
Coast Guard Report
The accident occurred while the vessel was anchored in Eugene Island Block 273, at Latitude N28-25.5, Longitude W91-36.8. The diver was diving at a depth of 103 feet and breathing surface supplied air. He was using his personal Kirby Morgan Superlite 17B dive helmet in addition to other personal dive gear. He was also wearing a helmet-mounted video camera that recorded both visual images of the work he was performing and audio of his communications with the dive shack aboard the MR. FRED. His assignment was to make a smooth cut around the end of a 36-inch diameter pipe in preparation for the installation of a bell guide. The first portion of the dive went well with nothing unusual to note. Forty-six minutes into the dive he had a minor problem using his helmet mounted headset to communicate with the dive shack. The source of the problem was a loose fitting on his helmet. He adjusted the fitting and was able to communicate with the vessel again. Four minutes and four seconds later, after a total of fifty minutes into his dive, the diver experienced a sudden and catastrophic loss of breathing air. His last words to the vessel's Rack Operator were, "My air." The vessel immediately put the Standby Diver into the water to assist. When the Standby Diver descended to the diver's location he found him unconscious and laying over a cross beam that was attached to the structure at a depth of 107 feet. His helmet was off of his head and his neck dam was missing. By the time the Standby Diver was able to bring the diver up to the surface he had been without air for seven minutes. The dive team aboard the MR. FRED immediately began performing CPR. They also administered oxygen and placed him in the onboard hyperbaric chamber in an attempt to revive him. They were unable to revive him. A post casualty inspection of the personal diving gear conducted at the U. S. Navy's Experimental Diving Unit in Panama City, FL found that a foreign object had lodged inside of the regulator in such a fashion as to prevent the flow of air to the diver. This effectively disabled both the surface supplied air and the emergency air supply that the diver carried with him. The inspection of the personal dive gear and interviews with crewmembers showed that there were other problems with his gear that likely contributed to the casualty. The dive-support equipment owned by CalDive/Aquatica aboard the MR. FRED was inspected and tested as a part of this investigation. It was found to be operating properly and in accordance with the regulations. The investigation identified some procedural deficiencies aboard the vessel. Had proper procedures been in place they may have helped identify some of the problems with the gear prior to the dive.

Full USCG report 1645241 available here



Chris's parents recently (8/2006) contacted offshorediver.com to correct the spelling of Chris's last name (sorry Chris) and additionally had this to say:



...Chris experienced a sudden and catastrophic loss of breathing air just after he directed the tugger to come up. He immediately yelled "slack the tugger" and "my air, my air". When they no longer got a response from him, they began rescue operations.



When they got him unto the deck, they administered oxygen as best they could with no emergency life saving equipment on board.



We are in hopes that:

1. emergency equipment would become standard on the dive vessels by now

2. emergency responses and recovery are practiced on a regular basis

3. mandatory hat checks are really mandatory



Sincerely,

Joan & Dick Mouritsen




Ted Davis Date: November 11th, 2000
Location: SP 28 Depth: 75
A diver was working on a pipeline when he lost communication with the surface. A second diver was unable to locate the first diver. The U.S. Coast Guard is investigating this incident.
The diver was jetting out a 24" pipeline that was severed by terrain shift in a mudslide area. Topside workers at a nearby platform the line tied in to were to flood the line to bring it to ambient pressure. The break was plugged with mud, the line was at surface pressure (0 psig) rather than flooded. While jetting, communications with the diver were lost and dive hose began running off the deck. The mud plug had given away and the diver was sucked into the break. His body was recovered by pushing a pig from the structure into a net secured over the break. Cause of death: Pressure differential and poor instructions/communication with non-diving personnel responsible for the pipeline.

Feb 2006 - email received citing diver's name as Ted Davis. Previous info here did not include this diver's name.




Jay Shepcot, ADS pilot,
Date: August 29th 1999
Location: GB 161 Depth: 972
The dive crew was working from a semi-submersible with an air gap of approximately 100 feet. As the ADS was being recovered, a piece of lifting tackle gave away and the ADS dropped to the end of a safety cable. The shock load swung the ADS up beneath the semi-sub where it hit and broke one arm off the suit before the safety cable was severed by the edge of the deck. The ADS fell into the sea and because of the missing arm flooded and sank to the pontoon. It is believed that the diver died of a broken neck which occured at the same time the arm was broken off. Once submerged, the suit flooded. Two standby dives were made before the diver was located and brought to the surface. This fatality is attributable to rigging failure.



Darrin Thomas Date:
Location: Red River, Baton Rouge, LA Depth: 15 to 20
The diver was working beneath a casino barge with dredging equipment when he lost comms with the surface. A standby diver was slow entering the water and once in the water was unable to locate the diver. The diver's body was recovered by civil rescue divers called to the scene.
Coast Guard press release regarding investigation available here

A friend of offshorediver.com who was at the scene 8 hours afterward describes his take on the accident from what he learned at the scene: They had been having trouble with their compressor. The job did not have an HP air backup to the compressor. Darrin was diving a hot water suit. Apparently the compressor packed up and Darrin decided to bail from his gear. The police divers located Darrin connected to his umbilical by only a QD attachment of the hotwater hose to his suit. The QD was sanded up and could not be released.




Brian Pilkington Date: March 4th 1996
Location: Off the coast of Texas Depth: 28
From an article in the SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER - this diver's home town newspaper.
Brian Pilkington and a co-worker, DW, arrived at the job site that day expecting to meet two other divers and KA, president and operations manager of Texas NDE, a testing company. Instead, the two met only KA, who had limited diving experience. For the next three hours, Pilkington remained under 28 feet of water, placing testing instruments on an oil rig so that measurements could be sent back to the surface.

Several times, DW, who was talking to Pilkington through a communications line, noticed that pressure gauges on the air compressor supplying Pilkington dropped from 150 pounds per square inch to as little as 80 to 90 pounds per square inch. DW had Pilkington close down the air-flow valve in his helmet to increase pressure. The pressure, though, dropped again, and DW told Pilkington to close the valve, but Pilkington said it was already shut. "At this point, DW realize(d) there was a larger problem," the Coast Guard report read. "Over the next several minutes DW had a garbled conversation with Pilkington, during which Pilkington's manner became increasingly frantic and his breathing rapidly increased to the point it was apparent he was hyperventilating." "Pilkington complained of not being able to breathe and said that he heard a hissing noise," the Coast Guard said in its report. "Pilkington speculated that he might have forgotten to tighten the air line to his helmet ... and thought the line might have worked free."

DW tried to pull up Pilkington by his "umbilical," which carried his air and communication lines, but it was caught on something. When Pilkington didn't respond, DW connected a high-pressure air bottle to Pilkington's air hose.

The bottle, though, emptied in about 15 minutes. Oil-rig workers then spent 15 to 20 minutes trying to string together cutting torch hose to create a makeshift air line to attach to KA diving helmet so that he could retrieve Pilkington. KA dived twice but found that an ax attached to Pilkington's belt was caught on a pipe. He refused to dive a third time, according to the report, so DW had to go into the water to cut Pilkington free and pull him to the surface. When Pilkington's helmet was removed, about a cup of water spilled out. His face was blue. He was airlifted to a hospital in Port Arthur, Texas, where he died about four hours later. A coroner ruled that he drowned.




Not recorded Date: Febuary 12th, 1993
Location: ST 152 Depth: 137
The fatality occurred while a diver was in the process of cutting a window in the 10 ¾ inch casing 138 feet below the surface. The surface personnel heard an explosion on the diver’s monitor. A standby diver went into the water immediately and when he reached the other diver he found him unconscious and his helmet off. The injured diver later died in the decompression chamber of cardiac arrest. Cause of death: underwater explosion of hydrogen/oxygen build-up while burning.



Not recorded Date: July 6th, 1992
Location: EI 273 Depth: 184
Preliminary reports indicate that a diver died while preparing the platform for a drilling rig. This incident is under investigation by the U.S. Coast Guard.

'Til we meet again...

[marrajo]

marrajo 6/10/2006 07:26
Re: Hay que hacer algo asi y publicarlo.

Expensive Knowledge
Nobody seems to want to talk about this except us, the divers. Dive contractors are historically closed mouthed on this topic. Agencies such as the Coast Guard, the MMS, the CDC, and others that regularly investigate and report on these events do not appear to work in concert. Facts as reported by one agency may be different or not present at all in the work of another. Where available, sources are attributed to the information presented. offshorediver.com warrants this information as correct to the best of it's knowledge but due to the difficulty of gathering this information and the often conflicting nature of sources, offshorediver.com does not stipulate that what you read here is the absolute and unassailable truth.
Further

Nadie quiere hablar de esto excepto nosotros, los buceadores. Los empresarios de buceo se callan, las agencias como los guardacostas mms y cdc parecen no trabajar juntos para mejorarlo.Los hechos del informe de una agencia no coinciden con los de otra o simplemente no aparecen,despues dice que la pagina no puede certificar que lo aqui contado (los accidentes) se ajuste exactamente a la realidad etc, etc......

[torpedo total]

torpedo total 6/10/2006 19:36
TRADUCELO Q NO SE ENTIENDE (s/t)

Sin Texto

[mortadelo]

mortadelo 6/10/2006 20:20
Re: TRADUCELO Q NO SE ENTIENDE (s/t)

Sin Texto

[hormiguita]

hormiguita 8/10/2006 20:34
para marrajo del carajo

A ver... marrajete... No será mejor que las noricias aparezcan en castellano a que cada uno de los que eentramos en el foro tengamos que utilizar herramientas extras para entender lo que tú quieres comunicar?... No sé....digo yo.

[Pato]

Pato 8/10/2006 22:55
Re: para los "muevepiedras"

Si no sabeis ingles y si ni tan siquiera sois capaces de utilizar herramientas extras, pues a mover piedras majetes. Luego no os querais llamar ni comparar con buceadores profesionales del mundo mundial ni querrais cobrar sus sueldos.
A si que al agua, chupete en la boca y cuatro horitas moviendo pedruscos y que no os vea sacar la cabeza antes, que vais a la puta calle.El contrato no os lo doy porque total, no lo vais a entender. Esta escrito con todas las palabras y vosotros como no sea sms con el movil, no sabeis casi leer. Si lo haceis bien os dejaré vacilar en el bar con las nenas pa que vean que sois buzos que es un "ofisio mu xulo".

[marrajo]

marrajo 9/10/2006 04:06
Re: para marrajo del carajo

¿Pero tu q te crees ???? que esto es salsa rosa??, ¿que te traduzca las noticias?? jajajajjaajaja, si quieres enterarte de los detalles morbosos o aprendes ingles o usas las "herramientas especiales" jejejejej ¿todo lo que no sea un rastrillo es una "herramienta especial"???
Lo que yo copie y pegue no es mas que la seccion de una pagina de buceadores profesionales donde se explican los accidentes y sus motivos para que los buceadores saquen algo util de esas muertes, eso lo habra entendido cualquiera de los que entramos aqui menos los dos listos que automaticamente protestan e insultan por todo.
Que si es necesario hablar ingles para ser un buen buceador profesional?? pues claro que nooooo, ni para ser una buena secretaria ni un buen dependiente, ni siquiera para ser un buen presidente del gobierno...para ser un buen buceador solo hay que saber tirar de maestra callladito y cobrar cuatro duros.....lastima de pais.

[mortadelo]

mortadelo 9/10/2006 00:50
patito patito

si para ser buen rana hay que saber ingles.... es que tu eres tonto chaval, asi k vete al extranjero a lucir palmito , no se mucho ingles.... pero te cojo y te enraso, filologo de los cojones!!!
hay que unirse mas que nunca y ya sale un clasista creando la agrupacion de buzos bilingues, ponte a trabajar

[MUY BUENA IDEA.MARIO]

MUY BUENA IDEA.MARIO 9/10/2006 13:46
Re: Hay que hacer algo asi y publicarlo.

UNA BUENA IDEA DESPUES DE SEIS MESES ..... UNA MEDALLA PARA MARRAJO .

PARA TODOS LOS DEMAS QUE NO SE HAN ENTERADO ,SE TRATA DE HACER ALGO ASI ,EN ESPAÑOL .
¡¡¡¡ IDIOTAS !!!

DE PASO AYUDAR AL SINDICATO :
--------- A QUE SE LEVANTE DE LA CAMA DE UNA PUTA VEZ ,Y DIGA ---¡JODER! COMO NO SE ME HABIA OCURRIDO A MI ANTES ,VAMOS HA HACERLO-----ASI QUEDARAN DE PUTA MADRE .

AH!!! SE ME OLVIDO ,QUE ESTA GENTE ,NUNCA COPIABA EN LOS EXAMENES ,ASI LES VA.

[Almenos ahora sabeis lo q]

Almenos ahora sabeis lo que dice 10/10/2006 00:24
Re: Hay que hacer algo asi y publicarlo.


TRADUCIO A CASTELLANO

La fecha: La ubicación: La profundidad: Ningunos informes formales están disponibles todavía. La identidad la notificación pendiente no revelada de la familia. El buzo aparentemente embolized cuando su manga de la zambullida fue tomada por rayo de manta.



La Fecha de Ryan Erter: 2 de agosto 2006 Ubicación: VR 250 Profundidad: Ningunos informes formales están disponibles todavía. El buzo Erter murió aparentemente en la cámara de plataforma después de recompression para DCS sospechado que sigue una zambullida normalmente ejecutada a aproximadamente 150 FSW. El empleador de Erter no ha liberado información con respecto al accidente y la comunidad que zambullen aguarda los informes del servicio de guardacostas y los MM.



La Fecha de Marc Begneaux: 5 de julio 2003 Ubicación: EW 827 Profundidad: 634 Informe del servicio de guardacostas el 05 de julio 2003, UN buzo fue pronunciado muerto como resultado de una explosión durante soldar las operaciones de una fuente submarina de gas localizaron en Bancos de Ewing (bloquea 827) del Golfo de México, aproximadamente 630 p debajo de la superficie. El informe repleto de
USCG 1867086 disponible aquíLa Fecha de Ted Davis: 11 de noviembre, 2000 Ubicación: SP 28 Profundidad: 75 UN buzo trabajaba en una tubería cuando él perdió comunicación con la superficie. Un segundo buzo era incapaz de localizar al primer buzo. Los EE.UU. El servicio de guardacostas investiga este incidente. El buzo lanzaba en chorro fuera una 24" tubería que fue cortada por el cambio de terreno en un área de deslizamiento de tierra. En cubierta trabajadores en una plataforma cercana que la línea referenció a debían inundar la línea para traérlo a la presión del ambiente. La interrupción se tapó con barro, la línea estaba en la presión de superficie (0 psig) antes que inundado. Al lanzar en chorro, comunicaciones con el buzo se perdieron y zambullen manga empezó correr la plataforma. El tapón del barro había regalado y el buzo fue chupado en la interrupción. Su cuerpo fue recuperado empujando un puerco de la estructura en una red asegurada sobre la interrupción. La causa de la muerte: Presione instrucciones/comunicación diferencial y pobre con el personal de no-zambulliendo responsable de la tubería.

Febrero 2006 - correo electrónico recibió citando el nombre de buzo como Ted Davis. La información previa aquí no incluyó este nombre de buzo.



El arrendajo Shepcot, piloto de ANUNCIOS, la Fecha: 29 de agosto 1999 Ubicación: GB 161 Profundidad: 972 La tripulación de la zambullida trabajaba de un medio submarino de olas con un espacio aéreo de aproximadamente 100 pies. Cuando los ANUNCIOS se recuperaban, un pedazo de levantar aparejo regaló y los ANUNCIOS dejados caer al fin de un cable de la seguridad. La carga del golpe columpió los ANUNCIOS arriba abajo el medio-sub donde lo golpeó y terminó un brazo el juicio antes el cable de seguridad fue cortado por la orilla de la plataforma. Los ANUNCIOS cayeron en el mar y a causa del brazo perdido inundaron y hundieron al pontón. Se cree que el buzo murió de un cuello roto que ocurrió al mismo tiempo el brazo se terminó. Una vez que sumergido, el juicio inundó. Dos zambullidas de la reserva se hicieron antes el buzo fue localizado y fue traído a la superficie. Este muerto es atribuible a aparejar el fracaso.



La Fecha de Darrin Thomas: La ubicación: El Río rojo, Colorete de Batuta, la Profundidad de LA: 15 a 20 El buzo trabajaban bajo una barcaza de casino con dragar el equipo cuando él perdió comms con la superficie. Un buzo de la reserva era entrar lento el agua y una vez en el agua era incapaz de localizar al buzo. El cuerpo del buzo fue recuperado por buzos civiles de rescate llamó a la escena. Costee el comunicado de prensa de Guardia con respecto a la investigación disponible aquí

Un amigo de offshorediver com que estaba en la escena 8 horas describen después su toma el accidente de lo que él aprendió en la escena: Ellos habían estado teniendo el problema con su compresor. El trabajo no tuvo un HP el respaldo aéreo al compresor. Darrin zambullía un juicio caliente de agua. Aparentemente el compresor empacó y Darrin decidió dar fianza de su engranaje. Los buzos de la policía localizaron Darrin conectó a su umbilical por sólo una fijación de QD de la manga de hotwater a su juicio. El QD se sanded arriba y no podría ser liberado.



La Fecha de Brian Pilkington: Marche 4 1996 Ubicación: De la costa de la Profundidad de Tejas: 28 De un artículo en el POSTE-INFORMADOR de SEATTLE - este periódico de pueblo natal de buzo. Brian Pilkington y un colega, DW, llegado en el sitio del trabajo que ese día que espera encontrar dos otros buzos y KA, director de presidente y operaciones de Tejas NDE, una compañía que prueba. En vez de eso, el dos encontraron sólo KA, que había limitado zambulliendo la experiencia. Para las próximas tres horas, Pilkington se quedó bajo 28 pies de agua, colocando instrumentos que prueban en una plataforma petrolífera para que medidas puedan ser devueltos a la superficie.


Varias veces, DW, que hablaba a Pilkington por una línea de comunicaciones, advirtió que eses manómetros en el compresor aéreo que suministra Pilkington dejaron caer de 150 libras por pulgada cuadrada hasta 80 a 90 libras por pulgada cuadrada. DW tuvo el fin de Pilkington hacia abajo la válvula de corriente de aire en el casco para aumentar la presión. La presión, aunque, dejado caer otra vez, y DW dijo Pilkington para cerrar la válvula, pero Pilkington dijo que ya se cerró. "En este momento, DW se da cuenta de (D) había un problema más grande," el informe del servicio de guardacostas leyó. "Sobre los próximos varios minutos DW tuvo una conversación mezclada con Pilkington, durante cuál manera de Pilkington llegó a ser cada vez más frenético y su respirar rápidamente aumentado al grano era aparente que él se hiperventilara." "Pilkington se quejó de no es capaz de respirar y dijo que él oía un ruido que silba," el servicio de guardacostas dijo en su informe. "Pilkington especuló que él se podría haber olvidado de apretar la línea aérea al casco... y pensó la línea podría haber trabajado libre."

DW trató de arrancarse Pilkington por su "umbilical," que llevó sus líneas de aire y comunicación, pero se agarró en algo. Cuándo Pilkington no respondió, DW conectó una botella aérea de alta presión a la manga aérea del Pilkington.

La botella, aunque, vaciado en acerca de 15 minutos. Los trabajadores del engrasa-aparejo entonces gastaron 15 a 20 minutos que tratan de ensartar cortando juntos manga de antorcha para crear una línea aérea provisional para conectar a KA que zambulle casco para que él pueda recuperar Pilkington. KA zambullió dos veces pero encontró que un hacha conectada al cinturón del Pilkington se agarró en un tubo. El se negó a zambullir una tercera vez, según el informe, así que DW tuvo que entrar el agua a cortar Pilkington liberta y lo tira a la superficie. Cuándo casco de Pilkington se quitó, acerca de una copa de agua rociada fuera. Su cara era azul. El fue aerotransportado a un hospital en el Puerto Arthur, Tejas, donde él murió acerca de cuatro horas más tarde. Un pesquisidor gobernó que él se ahogó.



La Fecha no registrada: 12 de Febuary, 1993 Ubicación: SAN 152 Profundidad: 137 El muerto ocurrió mientras un buzo estaba en el proceso de cortar una ventana en el 10 ¾ pulgada que embala 138 pies debajo de la superficie. El personal de superficie oyó una explosión en el monitor de buzo. Un buzo de la reserva entró el agua inmediatamente y cuando él alcanzó al otro buzo que él lo encontró inconsciente y el casco lejos. El buzo herido murió luego en la cámara de descompresión de paro cardíaco. La causa de la muerte: la explosión submarina de aumento de hidrógeno/oxígeno al quemar.



La Fecha no registrada: 6 de julio, 1992 Ubicación: EI 273 Profundidad: 184 informes Preliminares indican que un buzo murió al preparar la plataforma para un aparejo de perforación. Este incidente está bajo la investigación por los EE.UU.
Guardia COSTERA.